Introduction
Not too long ago, in a speech about the problems of immigrant integration in Germany, Angela Merkel proclaimed that "multiculturalism is dead". Indeed, politicians and political parties across Europe seem to have rejected the notion of multiculturalism policies that seek to both ease immigrant integration, and encourage immigrant incorporation amongst native-born citizens. Both right-wing radical and mainstream political forces are increasingly willing to limit how far Western societies will go to accommodate ethnic and religious minorities. Politicians and public figures have become more outspoken about their doubts about increasing diversity and the integration policies meant to manage it. And sceptics of multiculturalism argue that it creates segregation instead of integration, and fosters stereotyping and prejudice instead of tolerance. Joppke (2004) suggests that the retreat of multiculturalism policy in Western Europe is linked to a "chronic lack of public support," as well as its alleged inherent deficits and failures.
The death of multiculturalism may, however, be greatly exaggerated. While some radical changes in integration policies are discussed in party manifestos, only a few have been implemented, mainly in countries where governments have relied on radical right parties for votes in parliament. In practice, then, many of the policies associated with multicultural policy have been left intact (Kortweig and Triadafilopoulos 2012) . And recent efforts at building indices of multiculturalism policy suggest extensions, not contractions. (See, e.g., the BantingKymlicka index at http://www.queensu.ca/mcp.)
Canada provides a particularly interesting case study where multiculturalism policies are concerned. Canada was the first country to announce an official policy of multiculturalism in 1971, later enshrining multiculturalism in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 ; and the Canadian Multiculturalism Act was passed into legislation in 1988. Some argue that the idea of multiculturalism has actually become a key component of contemporary, Canadian identity (Kymlicka 1998; Mackay 2002) and that it has helped facilitate the political incorporation of immigrants (Bloemraad 2006) . Multiculturalism has certainly not suffered nearly the same public disavowal in Canada as in Europe. But there is an ongoing discussion about the effectsboth positive and negative --of multiculturalism in Canada (see, e.g., Bissoondath 1994; Gwyn 1995) .
In both European and Canadian contexts, then, multiculturalism policy is a current focus of both public and academic debate. We nevertheless know relatively little about how the public views multiculturalism policies. While attitudes toward immigration, diversity and social tolerance have been examined in detail, such work has often been mistaken as indicating support for multicultural policies. This paper seeks to fill this gap by developing a new set of questions asking about individual support for selected multicultural policies. It then examines the conditions citizens attach to their support for these policies, particularly how this support is affected by the ethnicity and religion of groups receiving these benefits and the respondent's values of diversity and difference. Using a unique experiment conducted within the 2011 Canadian Election Study (CES), we examine how ethnic origin (Portuguese vs. Turkish) and religious symbols (presence of the hijab) influence support for funding ethno-religious groups, and their access to public space.
The sections that follow address three related questions. First, how can we capture citizens' support for specific multicultural policies? Second, what are the conditions Canadians attach to their support? In other words, does support for multicultural policy vary alongside the ethnic and religious background of the groups who are benefitting from it? Third, how do citizens' general values toward cultural diversity moderate this effect? In short, while building on the insight that Canada is one of the most multicultural countries in the world where diversity and supportive policies are celebrated, we are interested in understanding the constraints and limits Canadians place on their support when confronted with concrete multicultural policies.
Research on Multiculturalism Policy

Defining Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism as a concept refers to the presence of multiple ethnocultural communities, and the ways in which these communities can and should interact. It has multiple meanings; we can distinguish three in particular, where multiculturalism is used to describe a society, an ideological position, and a set of policies:
1. Multiculturalism as a description of a society refers to the ethnic, religious, and/or cultural heterogeneity of a population. 2. Multiculturalism as an ideological position sees cultural difference as something that should be recognized and appreciated. Normative scholars have worked to justify this position (e.g., Schalk-Soekar et al. 2009; Parekh 2000; while others have examined the extent to which the public endorses it(e.g. Berry, Kalin and Taylor 1977; Berry 1984 Berry , 1997 Citrin et al. 2001; Breugelmans and van de Vivjer 2004; Verkuyten and Martinovic 2006; van de Vijver et al. 2008; Dandy and Pe-Pua 2010) . 3. Multiculturalism also refers to a set of policies that recognize cultural diversity and aims to reduce barriers to integration ; see also Esses 1996 , Koopmans 2010 , Banting and Kymlicka 2010 ).
Research to date has largely focused on multiculturalism as a description (which we will refer to simply as diversity), and as an ideology. Regarding the former, there has been an explosion of interest in the consequences of diversity for democratic societies (for a review, see Harell and Stolle 2010) . For example, recent findings in the US (Putnam 2007 , Hero 2003 and Canada (Soroka et al. 2007 ) suggest that local diversity drives down social trust and overall societal engagement. Regarding the latter, normative arguments about multiculturalism have been the subject of intense debate amongst scholars of political philosophy (see, e.g., Benhabib 1996; Parekh 2000; Taylor and Gutmann 1992) .
Related to normative arguments about multiculturalism is the study of citizens' endorsement of ethno-cultural diversity. This has been the focus of acculturation scholars in psychology. Berry (1984; has developed a multicultural attitudes scale based on a model of acculturation, for instance; for Berry and colleagues, multiculturalism is underpinned by immigrants maintaining one's own culture and building positive relations with other cultures. Endorsement of multiculturalism among majority members is therefore a psychological construct that taps essentially into a recognition of diversity and support for preserving nonnative cultures (e.g. Berry, Kalin and Taylor 1977; Berry 1984 Berry , 1997 Breugelmans and van de Vivjer 2004; Verkuyten and Martinovic 2006; van de Vijver et al. 2008; Dandy and Pe-Pua 2010) .
Note that this psychological approach operationalizes multiculturalism largely as a value or attitude toward cultural diversity -it does not directly address multicultural policies directed at promoting or managing that diversity.
Research on multicultural policy has also received attention, but is mostly focused on the consequences for immigrants' integration. In this paper, we are interested especially in multiculturalism as a policy, but instead of examining its consequences, we try to better understand the sources and structure of citizens' (individual-level) attitudes toward concrete multiculturalism policies. First, though, the following section reviews the literature on multiculturalism policy more generally.
Multiculturalism as Policy
As Kymlicka and Banting (2010) note, the term multicultural policy is ambiguous and overlaps many policy areas. Broadly speaking, multicultural policies "impose on public institutions an obligation to reduce barriers to immigrant participation and more accurately reflect the diversity of the population" (Kymlicka 2003: 202) . Thus, multicultural policies publicly recognize and institutionalize ethnic heterogeneity arising from immigration. They can be evident at all stages of the migration and integration process, from the immigration laws governing who gets admitted, to the legal status of non-citizens, to the naturalization of immigrants and the expectations of citizenship . Banting and Kymlicka (2006) outline three possible positive externalities of multicultural policies. The first is the de-stigmatization of ethnicity. Although on the one hand multicultural policies may increase public attentiveness to cultural differences, they do so in order to challenge the prejudices associated with them. They allow groups to see themselves as different but equally worthy of respect. Secondly, they can contain nation-building components, which have a bonding effect between newcomers and host citizens. These types of policies usually involve language training, citizenship education, and celebrations of diversity. Third, when both of these are used in combination, multiculturalism can become a defining aspect of national identity, and a source of collective pride. Reitz (2011) adds to this list the suggestion that multicultural policy can act as a public relations campaign for immigration. Multicultural policy encourages the perspective that immigrants offer a cultural as well as economic benefit to a country (see also Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002) . According to Reitz, support for multiculturalism is a necessary pre-condition for support for immigration.
This view of the merits of multicultural policy is highly contested, however. Even in Reitz's own work, he argues that multicultural policy may not be sufficient to ensure integration (Reitz and Banarjee 2009) . Rather, multicultural policy can make native-born citizens feel that "enough" is being done for racialized immigrant groups, when in reality the inequalities they experience are complex and multicultural policy alone may not address all of the challenges. Abu-Laban and Gabriel (2002) further suggest that policies related to diversity have been largely constructed within a neo-liberal framework that views immigrants solely as prospective workers that need to justify their inclusion. In so doing, these authors suggest that multiculturalism policy has been increasingly reframed in terms of global competitiveness, and as a result is unable to adequately deal with equity issues.
In the context of increasing ethnic, racial and religious diversity, then, some see multicultural policies as inadequate. Others see them as making matters worse. For example, Miller (1995) argues that multicultural policies draw attention to difference by emphasizing that some groups need differential support. This may have a detrimental effect on nation building and fostering a sense of national unity (see also Bissoondath 1994; Gwyn 1995; Brewer 1997) . Moreover, there is a fear that multicultural policies suggest to immigrants that they do not need to adjust to the standards and lifestyles of the native populations, and that by exasperating difference they pose a challenge to social trust and social cohesion (Barry 2002) . Multicultural policy may thus slow down the integration process of minorities, as well as have adverse consequences for national unity.
There is some empirical work supporting this view. Koopmans (2010) suggests that multicultural policies seem to create barriers to socio-economic integration by keeping immigrants unemployed, particularly when these policies are combined with a generous welfare state. That said, the bulk of the existing evidence seems to show that concerns about these negative consequences of multiculturalism policy are not especially well founded. The Canadian case, in particular, is often held up as an example of multicultural policy working well, with native-born citizens comparatively open to social diversity (Reitz 2011; Soroka and Roberton 2010) and ethno-cultural minorities integrated into the economic and social life of the country (Wright and Blooemraad 2012, Kymlicka 2010 , Blooemraad 2006 . Indeed, recent cross-national work has found positive effects of multicultural policy on both majorities and minorities. Multicultural policies do not appear to weaken societal engagement and trust in others (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010); they strengthen immigrants' sense of inclusion and foster a lack of perceived discrimination (Wright and Bloemraad 2012); they have no discernible effect on national commitments towards redistributive policy ; and they appear to be related to increasingly positive associations between national identity and support for immigration (Soroka et al. 2012) . In sum, while the political debate about multiculturalism may have turned sour, research on the consequences of multicultural policies provides a more positive picture.
All of this said, however, it remains true that relatively little is known about how individual citizens feel about actual multicultural policies, and about the conditions under which citizens are more or less inclined to support them. There does exist some aggregate-level work that provides a general sense for trends in support for multicultural policy, in the Canadian case at least. We know that in the early 1980's the majority of Canadians were completely unaware that a multicultural policy even existed; and that this had changed continuously throughout the following years such that by the turn of the century about 80% of the population knew about multicultural policies (Dasko 2003) . We also know that, overall, Canadians show rather high levels of support for diversity, immigration and the general idea of multiculturalism (Soroka & Roberston 2010) . For example, 84% of Canadians agreed that 'Canada's multicultural makeup is one of the best things about this country' (Ipsos-Reid, 2007) . Canadians tend to favour immigration more than other people in countries; they are also less likely to adjust their support based on the ethnic background of immigrants themselves (Harell et al N.d.) . Even when asked about Canada's multicultural policy, three out of four young Canadians and far more than half of those over 25 years old have positive views of Canadian Multicultural Policy (ACS 2012) . Support for the specific policies of multiculturalism nevertheless remains relatively unexplored. Developing measures of such policy support is an important contribution of this paper.
Supporting Multiculturalism Policy-What are the constraints?
Canadian support for multiculturalism is not entirely unconstrained. Two general sources of constraint are of interest to us here: the ethnic and religious background of the policy beneficiaries, and individual attitudes towards diversity and difference. First, the target groups for multiculturalism policies, alongside related attitudes about those target groups, may affect support for policies. We know from extensive research in social psychology that people are particularly prone to categorizing out-group members in negative ways, particularly when they are distant from the in-group (Allport 1954; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Dovidio et al. 2003) . In politics, we know that prejudicial attitudes do have an effect on policy attitudes that benefit specific groups (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Frederico and Holmes 2005; Gilens 1995; Peffley 1997, 2002; Krysan 2000; Sniderman et al. 2000) , even if they do not fully explain such attitudes (Kuklinski et al. 1997) . Thus, if particular outgroups appear to be beneficiaries of multicultural policies, this may affect support.
In other words, support for multicultural policies is unlikely to exist in a vacuum from the actual recipients of these benefits, and in the Canadian context, we know that not all groups are viewed equally by the general public. Berry and Kalin (1991) find that immigrant groups of non-European background are less accepted by Canadians than those of European origin, and later public opinion research suggests that more than half of Canadians indicate that they have a moderately or very unfavourable opinion towards Islam, by far the highest proportion of any religion (Angus Reid, 2009). 1 We also expect that support for multicultural policies are affected by more general attitudes about diversity and difference, in particular, attitudes about immigrant integration and/or assimilation. Multiculturalism policy itself clearly is (at least intended) as a means for integration, and was conceived within a larger nation-building project (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002). Two of the four components of Trudeau's original policy included the removal of cultural barriers to allow for the full participation of ethnic groups in Canadian society as well as training in the two official languages, after all. In other words, the celebration of diversity is viewed, at least from a policy perspective, as a means to integration. That said, by celebrating difference multicultural policies also encourage it. In essence, they pull in both directions -encouraging integration by celebrating and accommodating difference. This is no simple task, however, and Thus it appears that accommodation is less likely to be supported for groups who appear to be different or distinct. This can also be seen in survey questions when asking about the banning of headscarves in public schools, and in questions about support for religious (mostly non-Christian) schools, as both types of accommodation are generally not supported by the Canadian majority (Soroka and Robertson 2010) . These analyses indicate that even if Canadians may champion the general idea of respecting cultural diversity and are generally supportive of multiculturalism policy, when asked to make accommodation for specific groups, underlying prejudices can temper this support. We expect, therefore, a gap between general enthusiasm for diversity, immigration and multiculturalism, and the application of these values to specific groups. the creation and implementation of multicultural policies is regularly fraught with considerations of what exactly is the right balance of integration/assimilation, and difference.
We thus expect citizens' attitudes about integration/assimilation and difference will structure their support of multicultural policies. Moreover, we expect that Canadians will exhibit some of the same concerns about the right balance of integration/assimilation and difference that has been part of the policy debate. Past work points in this direction, of course. We know that Canadians support the idea of a society where everyone is accepted, for instance, but that they are simultaneously concerned about immigrants not wanting to adopt Canadian values; they also expect immigrants to make an observable effort to become citizens and to internalize the national narrative . The most recent Canadian Election Study shows that while support for multicultural policies is high, about half of Canadians are also worried that "too many immigrants do not want to fit in" (Behnke 2012 ). According to Banting and Kymlicka, then, "for immigrants to demand multicultural accommodations while resisting these nation-building components would be seen as insulting and abusive " (2006: 302) . In short, support for multiculturalism in Canada does not seem to reflect the belief that integration is not necessary; and indeed support for multiculturalism may in fact be premised on the expectation that it makes integration more likely.
Work in social psychology provides a way to conceptualize this "acculturation orientation." Dating back to the 1970s, Berry and colleagues, argue that multicultural policy is underpinned by the belief that it is important to maintain the cultural characteristics of one's own group while simultaneously fostering positive relations with other groups in society. Essentially, multicultural attitudes or a multiculturalism ideology is viewed as an acculturation orientation defined as integrationist (this is juxtaposed to assimilation, separation and marginalisation, see Berry 1984; Kalin 1979, 1995; Bourhis et al. 1997.) . According to Berry and Kalin (1995) , this is the first condition required to maintain a multicultural society.
Building on Berry et al., the comparative social psychological work thus defines multiculturalism as "an ideology for dealing with cultural diversity, entailing the equality and positive evaluation of different (cultural) . The social psychological work has focused on explaining these attitudes, especially as they relate to feelings about various groups in society, contact between groups, and experiences of discrimination (e.g. Verkuyten and Martinovic 2006) and how they relate to diversity within a society (Chryssochoou 2000) .
The challenge for our paper is distinguishing between this value-based definition of multiculturalism which relies on citizens' general attitudes toward cultural diversity, and citizens' attitudes toward the policies that are created to accommodate immigrants. While a general value or ideological perspective toward diversity is one thing, as we have argued, there is reason to believe that citizens may react differently when specific policies, that target specific groups, are queried. Past work has focused entirely on the former; we aim to explore both.
Method and Design
Support for multicultural policies is measured here in two ways: first, we have a general measure of attitudes toward the funding of ethnic groups, and second, we ask about support for a specific ethno-religious organization receiving both funding and access to public space. The second measure involves experimentally cuing to the ethnic and religious background of an ethnic association. Most generally and given the literature on out-group attitudes, we expect that policies that target more culturally distinct out-groups will receive lower support. This should be particularly true for policies that affect the respondent's daily experiences.
The data used for this study come from the 2011 Canadian Election Study. We focus primarily on an experimental vignette that was embedded in the web-wave. The web-wave was the fourth wave of the CES, and respondents who participated in past waves were contacted by both mail and email and invited to participate. The online format is advantageous, because it allows for a high feeling of anonymity on the part of respondents, which can reduce social desirability often found in face-to-face methods. Furthermore, it eliminates some of the reactivity typically found in experiments when participants know they are being observed. In this case, participants are not aware that the vignettes are being manipulated, as they are embedded in a more standard public opinion survey.
Respondents are exposed randomly to one of three vignettes. All three vignettes use images of the same woman. In the first vignette, the woman is presented as Helena, the president of the Canadian Portuguese-Catholic Action Network. In the second vignette, using the exact same photograph, the woman is presented as Fatma, the president of the Canadian Turkish-Muslim Action Network. In the third vignette, the text is identical to the second vignette, but this time shows "Fatma" wearing a hijab. After reading the vignette, respondents are asked the same two questions: first, they are asked whether they support or oppose the group receiving an $80 000 grant from Canada's Multiculturalism Grants and Contributions program to fund an outreach project to raise awareness of the group's contribution to Canada's culture; second, they are asked whether they support or oppose the municipality providing space in a local community centre for their project. There are four possible responses to each question: strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, and strongly opposed. Respondents are not given the option to answer "don't know" or "neither support nor oppose."
The three manipulations test how citizens respond to out-groups from culturally traditional and non-traditional source countries, varying the cultural distance. The PortugueseCatholic manipulation provides a base category to which the other two can be compared, since Portuguese immigrants have been established in Canada for over 50 years. The use of a TurkishMuslim is intended to cue a group that is more culturally distant from the majority. Within the Turkish-Muslim scenarios, the hijab can be seen as a symbol of non-integration. Although it clearly would not evoke the same response as something more controversial like the burqa, it is symbolic of an immigrant group publicly retaining part of their original culture that distinguishes them from dominant culture. For some, it can be seen as a symbol of nonintegration.
The multicultural policies addressed in each question may reveal differences in the magnitude and structure of public support. The $80,000 grant represents a tougher case, since this is a considerable sum of money, whereas the community centre is not. That said the $80,000 implies a detached level of support; the government will provide the group with the grant, presumably from tax dollars, and the respondent will not be directly or personally affected. In contrast, the community centre question targets the respondents' municipality, and thus the policy may directly affect the participant. We thus expect stronger effects of outgroup cues and out-group attitudes on the policy that is focused on the neighborhood. Both dependent variables range from 0, strongly oppose, to 3, strongly support. Both variables are highly correlated (at .57, p<.001); still there is real variance across responses, in spite of the fact that the two questions are asked one after the other. Clearly, the questions capture different dimensions of support for multiculturalism; they also have, as we shall see, slightly different predictors.
Our analyses also include direct measures of support for multicultural policies, based on 3 questions in the post-election telephone survey of the CES. (This wave of the survey came before the web-based part of the survey.) The questions are as follows:
The federal government funds ethnic groups to help them keep their identities and fit into Canadian society… do these programs: 1) Canadian identity? 2) build a richer Canadian identity? 3) actually prevent minorities from integrating into Canadian society? Response categories are "yes" or "no," and are recoded here so that pro-ethnic group funding was 1. The Multicultural Policy Scale (MCP) is an additive scale over these three items (Cronbach's alpha is 0.7).
We also capture attitudes towards assimilation values. These are measured using 3 questions from the mail-back portion of the CES. The three questions are: 1) Too many recent immigrants just don't want to fit in. 2) Recent immigrants should set aside their cultural background and blend into Canada 3) Speaking English or French should be a requirement for immigration to Canada. Responses are four-point agree/disagree scales. The three items are used to create an additive scale ranging from 0 to 1 (Cronbach's alpha=.65). Scores closer to 0 represent an acceptance of difference, and scores closer to 1 indicate a desire for assimilation. The average score on this index is 0.41 with a standard deviation of 0.22. We expect that, on average, a desire for assimilation drives down support for multicultural policies; though there may also be a more complex relationship between assimilation and multicultural policy support. This may be apparent in the way which assimilation attitudes moderate the experimental treatment.
[ Table 1 about here] Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the sample. As mentioned, respondents were randomly assigned to each group. Comparing the three experimental groups (group 1=Portuguese-Catholic, group 2=Turkish-Muslim and group 3=Turkish-Muslim with a hijab) there are a few potential threats to internal validity due to uneven distributions between the three groups even though they were randomly assigned. Looking at age, group 1 had 10% more participants in the 35-54 age range than group 2, and 13% more than group 3. In the 55+ age category, group 1 had 13% less than group 2 and 11% less than group 3. Looking at age as a continuous variable, the average age for group 1 is lowest at 54.2, group 2 is highest at 56.6 and group 3 55.6. A two-tailed t-test reveals that the average age for group 1 is significantly different than the other two groups at p<0.1 (p=0.09). There are also 7% fewer females in group 2. This difference is significant from the other two groups at p<0.01 (p=0.09).
It should also be noted that the participants in the 4 th wave web experiment differ from those in the 1 st wave campaign survey. Two-tailed t-tests indicate that participants in the web experiment are significantly older by around 2 years at p<0.01, wealthier at p<0.01, more likely to be male at p<0.05 and more educated at p<0.01. Thus the sample for the web experiment may yield conservative estimates, since individuals who are more educated and have higher incomes tend to feel less threatened by diversity and immigrants (Citrin et al. 2007) .
The result section is structured in the following way: First, we present results for our specific and general measures of support for multicultural policy. Second, we explore the first constraint we examine whether inter-ethnic contact increases support for multicultural policies, either directly or in combination with the experimental manipulation in their multicultural support. Using ordered logit regressions, we look at the effects of the experiment independently, and then move to integrate the direct effects of the assimilation-difference attitudes, and conclude with interaction models. We also include various socio-demographic variables that might affect the support for multicultural policies.
Examining Support for Multiculturalism Policy
We begin with a look at our direct measure of support for multicultural policy, which is generally positive, as illustrated in Figure 1 . More than half of Canadians usually support "ethnic programs." 54% do not believe that it prevents immigrants from integrating, and 51% say that the programs do not weaken Canadian identity; whereas about 49% claim that they help to build a richer Canadian identity. Considering that these programs do not benefit the average Canadian directly, this suggests moderately strong support for federal government funding to ethnic groups. The MCP scale reflects this middle-level support. On the scale from 0 to 3, where 3 indicates pro-multicultural funding for all three items, the average score is 1.54. Fiftyeight percent of respondents were on the positive half of the scale, with fully 38% choosing the pro-multiculturalism funding position on all three items. We take this as particularly strong support, given that two of the items in the scale are negative statements, requiring the respondent to disagree with them to be coded as the pro-multiculturalism.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Turning to the questions on specific multicultural policies, and our experimental manipulations, results suggest that participants are more supportive of the community centre providing space, compared to the government grant. The average response hovers closer to "somewhat support" for the community centre space, and hovers closer to "somewhat oppose" for the $80 000 grant. Thus while more than half of the respondents were generally positive about the effects of funding for ethnic groups, when confronted with a concrete example and concrete financial figure, Canadians seem to be more hesitant at first sight. In contrast, they seemed more willing to make public space available at the community centre.
[ Figure 2 about here] Figure 2 shows the average support (0-3) for each dependent variable by treatment group (with error bars). The treatment does matter to levels of support. Average support for community centre space decreases as we move from a relatively less distanced ethno-religious group to the more distant Muslim group, as expected. That is to say, respondents are most supportive of a Portuguese-Catholic receiving space (1.82 average), and least supportive of the Turkish-Muslim with the hijab (1.66 average). The pattern, however, is reversed for the $80,000 grant. Here, results suggest that when it comes to financial support, citizens may see less of a need to financially support an immigrant from a traditional source country, while those of nontraditional source countries may seem like more deserving recipients. Interestingly, while we expected that the presence of a Muslim religious symbol's would create greater hostility, it had no readily-discernible effect.
[ Table 2 about here] Table 2 presents the coefficients, standard errors, and p values for ordered logit regressions for the experimental treatment, and confirms the insights from Figure 2 . Being exposed to the Turkish Muslim woman with the hijab in comparison to the Portuguese woman decreases the odds of support for the community centre space by 24% on the 0-3 scale (p<0.08). Being exposed to the Turkish woman without the hijab versus the Portuguese woman decreases the odds of support by 14%, but is not significant. On the other hand, the odds of support for the 80k grant increase for the two Turkish-Muslim groups in comparison to the Portuguese Catholic group by roughly 40% on the 0-3 scale. Although the r-squares are low, and the coefficients are small, the direction of the trends is nonetheless clear. When it comes to promoting multiculturalism in the neighbourhood by providing space, respondents seem to be more supportive of culturally similar immigrant groups. This trend is reversed for the grant, but support overall is markedly lower. The different patterns for the two measures of support for multicultural policy suggests that the nature of the policy (monetary vs. other) and the implication for the local neighborhood both are likely to affect how citizens respond to multicultural policies. Table 3 presents ordered logistic regressions that explore whether general attitudes toward cultural diversity and assimilation shape support for specific multicultural policies. The first column is the direct effect only of the treatments and assimilation values measure. The second column includes interaction terms allowing us to test whether the general values moderate the effect of cues, and the third column includes a fully specified model with controls. Assimilationist attitudes play an important role in multicultural policy support (models 2). Not surprisingly, those who are more assimilationist are much less likely to support the specific multicultural policies (p<.01). More interestingly, when we look at the interaction models (models 3), there is evidence to suggest that those who are more assimilationist also react distinctly to the target group cues in the experiment. In particular, assimilationists are less supportive of access to public space when presented with the Turkish Muslims, both with and without a hijab. (Though the former interaction coefficient just barely misses statistical significance here.) For the $ 80,000 grant, assimilationists also give distinctly less support to the both Turkish Muslims, though again the interaction with the scenario involving Fatma with the hijab just misses significance in one of the models. Low assimilationists, on the other hand, give significantly more to both Muslim groups.
[ Figures 3 and 4 about here] Figure 3 illustrates estimated support for community centre space; Figure 4 does the same for funding. Each captures support based on (a) experimental treatment, and (b) whether respondents scored high (1), moderately (.5), or low (0) on the assimilation-difference scale. With respect to the community centre, it is clear that high assimilationist values subtract from the support for the community Centre. Moreover, high assimilationists also make more of a distinction between the Catholic and Muslim beneficiaries. This distinction disappears with moderate and low assimilationists. To the contrary, low assimilationists give more support to the community centre not just overall, but in addition in scenarios when the beneficiary is a Muslim (effect not significant). A similar, however, much more accentuated pattern seems to occur for funding. Assimilationists support much less funding for ethnic groups overall, but they also give less to Muslim claimants. For low and moderate assimilationists the pattern is reversed, that is they seem to significantly give more the Muslim groups.
Conclusion
This paper has been one of the first to measure specific support for multicultural policies. It has shown that while more than half of Canadians are supportive when asked general questions about multicultural policies, support declines when questions deal with concrete ethnic groups and concrete dollar values for such programs. Between the two specific scenarios explored here, Canadians are more willing to consider offering access to public space to immigrant groups who ask for it than to hand out an $ 80,000 grant for an ethnic program.
Moreover, our results suggest that support for multicultural policies is conditioned by a combination of (a) the ethnicity of recipients, and (b) attitudes about assimilation. That is, while supporting the access to community space more widely, Canadians make distinctions as to who should get the space. Culturally more distanced groups are less likely to receive space, particularly when they wear open religious symbols (e.g. the hijab), and thus potentially demonstrate that they do not necessarily adjust to mainstream attitudes in society. This type of discrimination does not exist when it comes to the grant, when Canadians are willing to give more to more distanced cultural minorities, who are perhaps also perceived as new immigrants and therefore as more deserving.
These outcomes are in part moderated by values of assimilation and difference. Assimilationists do not just support multicultural policies less enthusiastically; they also make more distinctions between the types of groups, and end up giving even less to culturally distant groups. Low assimilationists on the other hand are generally more supportive of multicultural policies, and they do also make fewer distinctions between groups. If anything, they seem to give more support to culturally distinct groups when it comes to actual funding.
How do our results inform us about the support of multiculturalism in Canadian society? Clearly, support for multiculturalism although relatively high is not independent from the desire for integration and assimilation. While values of assimilation and support for multiculturalism are negatively related, the median Canadian is a moderate assimilationist and moderately in support of multicultural policy (results not shown). Thus we cannot characterize Canadians as people who unconditionally support multicultural policies. Their support is embedded in the understanding that these policies integrate and to a degree assimilate minority groups.
We suggest two extensions of our current work. First, future work should further develop concrete questions about support for multicultural policies using different experimental vignettes in order to further explore the multiple facets of public perceptions and support for multiculturalism as a policy. More concrete scenarios varying the dollar amounts and types of programs might provide a better understanding of support for these policies and the limits of this support. Second, future work should also set out to more thoroughly explain these policy attitudes. Other out-group attitudes and experiences with out-groups, for example, might also be important for understanding varying levels of support. Moreover, a cross-national comparison of such policy support and its predictors could give us a rich insight into the dynamics between different types of levels of diversity, out-group attitudes, overall experiences with multiculturalism and policy support. 
